The timing of Hajj performance (imtithāl) following the realization of capability (istiṭā‘ah) has long been a subject of contention among jurists. Relying on the apparent import of certain texts and claiming consensus (ijmā‘), the majority of jurists advocate for “Religious Urgency” (fawriyyah shar‘iyyah). This implies that delaying Hajj is not merely risking the loss of the obligation but is inherently detested by the Lawgiver and religiously unlawful. Conversely, this study employs a descriptive-analytical method and a critical re-examination of the jurisprudential corpus to test the hypothesis of “Rational Urgency” (fawriyyah ‘aqliyyah). The findings indicate that the threefold evidence (the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and Reason) fails to establish a religious restriction necessitating immediate performance. A meticulous analysis of six categories of relevant narrations—including those threatening death as a Jew or condemning procrastination (taswīf)—reveals that the language of these texts either addresses the “principle of discharging the duty before death” or emphasizes the “special importance” of this religious pillar; they do not denote a devotional prohibition of delay, provided there is assurance of continued life. Furthermore, the claims of consensus and the practice of the pious (sīrah) were deemed to lack independent probative value due to the probability of being based on existing textual evidence (madrakī). Ultimately, by distinguishing between the “religious obligation to hasten” and the “rational necessity of preventing loss,” this study adopts “Rational Urgency” as the preferred view. This conclusion, while preserving the exalted status of Hajj, resolves the practical impasses faced by pilgrims in the contemporary era.